Your pipelines are code. So we read them.

Static analysis on your workflow files. Injection, unpinned actions, over-privileged tokens, OIDC drift.

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commita3f9c2e · release.yml

build#4821 · #4822

CybeDefend gaterelease.yml read

deployprod-eu

blockedpull_request_target · contents: writedeployeduses: @7a3c…e4f · contents: read

commita3f9c2e · release.yml

build#4821 · #4822

CybeDefend gaterelease.yml read

deployprod-eu

blockedpull_request_target · contents: writedeployeduses: @7a3c…e4f · contents: read

Six CI dialects feed one parser: GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Bitbucket, Azure DevOps, Jenkins, CircleCI.Commit a3f9c2e touches release.yml. Two runs leave the build: #4821 and #4822.At the gate, release.yml is read as an attacker would: trigger, permissions, every uses: and run:.#4821 is blocked: pull_request_target with contents: write and an unpinned action never reach the deploy job.#4822 ships to prod-eu: pinned SHA, read-only token, the PR title kept out of the shell.

Six pipeline flaws
in the file.

We parse your workflows into an AST and a dataflow graph, then run our own rule packs.

Default GITHUB_TOKEN scopes are write to almost everything. We detect unset permissions:, broad scopes you don't use, and recommend the minimal set per job.

permissions: write-all

permissions:

contents: read

id-token: write

Untrusted PRs writing to caches that protected branches read from. Self-hosted runner reuse without isolation.

runs-on: self-hosted

runs-on: ubuntu-24.04

@v3, @main, @latest, every floating ref is a future supply-chain incident.

uses: actions/checkout@v3

uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2

AWS, Azure and GCP federated identity from GitHub, GitLab and CircleCI.

role/deploy › trust policy › sub

repo:acme/*

repo:acme/api:environment:production

Any time you interpolate ${{ github.event.* }}, branch names, PR titles or issue bodies into a run: block, you're shell-injecting your own pipeline.

run: echo "${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}"

env:

TITLE: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}

run: echo "$TITLE"

echo $SECRET, secrets passed as positional args, secrets logged to artefacts, secrets baked into container layers.

run: ./publish.sh ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}

env:

NPM_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}

run: ./publish.sh

Point at a flagged line to open its fix.Tap a note to open its fix.

Catch the misconfig
before the runner runs.

Most pipeline incidents are already visible in the YAML. We read it the way an attacker does.

.github/workflows/release.yml:12source
message: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}
.github/workflows/notify.yml:4hop
message: { type: string }
.github/workflows/notify.yml:10sink
run: echo "${{ inputs.message }}"

cybedefendcommented onnotify.yml:10

pull_request.title reaches run: through inputs.message.

run: echo "${{ inputs.message }}"

env: { MSG: "${{ inputs.message }}" }

run: echo "$MSG"

Workflow files get the same scrutiny as your application code: AST parsing, taint propagation, source-to-sink analysis.